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Abstract
We attempt to automate various artistic processes by inventing a set
of drawing games, analogous to the approach taken by emergent lan-
guage research in inventing communication games. A critical difference
is that drawing games demand much less effort from the receiver than do
language games. Artists must work with pre-trained viewers who spend
little time learning artist specific representational conventions, but who
instead have a pre-trained visual system optimized for behaviour in the
world by understanding to varying extents the environment’s visual af-
fordances. After considering various kinds of drawing game we present
some preliminary experiments which have generated images by closing
the generative-critical loop.
1 Introduction
What is a drawing? Sadly, no other animal represents the world with language
or drawing. Early examples of drawing date back to 60,000 years ago [19],
though red pigments for mark making are already found 200,000 years ago in
the middle stone age [18]. “The first man to make a mammoth appear on the
wall of a cave was, I am confident, amazed by what he had done” writes Gibson,
because they had discovered that by means of lines they could delineate some-
thing [10] p263. What allowed humans to learn to create (visual) abstractions,
e.g., the Western child’s human stick figure, the Australian aboriginal top-down
projections of people seated around a fireplace, the Egyptian formalism for rep-
resenting things in orthographic projection with multiple station-points, and
with social dominance relations transformed into size differences, or the 16th
Century Japanese affine projections that have a birds-eye viewpoint? Mak-
ing our own abstraction creating (drawing) machines is one way to find out
the answer. A wonderful start was made by Harold Cohen’s abstract drawing
programs “Aaron” [6]. Aaron and Harold produced beautiful and interesting
abstracted drawings that looked as if they had been made by a human alone.
But it had no learning, was not conditioned on looking at the world, and was an
entirely hand designed production system (a complex set of hierarchical rules
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for drawing).
Artists have invented visual abstractions over historical timescales, for exam-
ple, various perspective projections for transforming 3D things into 2D pictures.
A picture is an interpretation of what it portrays. Some object property or re-
lation, of the visual scene (e.g. the object identity or relative location) is first
apprehended or isolated in the mind, then represented in the drawing, leaving
out a whole lot of other unnecessary features which are of no pragmatic interest
at the time [2]. A picture preserves a subset of the critical features of the image
necessary to represent the desired property, e.g. its occluding edges, but ideally
no confusing other. A lawful transformation links the image to its drawing.
Consider the following examples: a child’s drawing of a human figure or tree
as a collection of circles, ovals and straight lines, chronology shown in a comic
book, shading shown by cross-hatching.
The process of visual abstraction is analogous to the process of linguistic ab-
straction by which words are invented, but with one crucial difference. Whilst
the word cat does not itself resemble a cat, and neither does the word cat sound
like a cat (i.e. it is not onomatopoeic), the picture of the cat will resemble the
real cat visually if it is to be understood universally. Resemblance here means
that a pre-trained classifier for cats will give high probability to a cat drawing
without needing further training on cat drawings. We call a representation that
requires no further special training from the viewer to understand its referent,
a veridical representation. On the other hand, some representations of cats are
so abstract that they cannot be understood unless this pictorial ‘language’ has
been previously learned. In general, what makes visual depiction different from
language is that in a lot of (but not all) cases of visual depiction it is possible to
understand what the picture means without having to have any special train-
ing for the viewer other than the universal visual experience we all have. This
is almost never the case in language where it is necessary to have heard that
particular language very often before one can understand it, although even in
this case there is deep multi-model abstraction as shown in the Kiki effect [28],
and language similarities which allow some transfer between languages.
Pictures we draw can have various extents of veridicality, some verge on
perfect photorealism but others are entirely arbitrary (linguistic) symbols. In
the middle we have various kinds of visual abstraction, see Figure 1. At one ex-
treme, we can attempt to represent abstract nouns using drawings, e.g. we can
draw democracy (cohesion with individuality), youth (upward growth), mar-
riage (fitting together), or past, present and future, if we are asked to [2]. In
these cases, the drawing representation is very metaphorical and the relations
between the abstract noun and the drawing are more distant, but a viewer may
be able to at least guess what is represented. Some scientific diagrams, e.g.
Cartesian graphs, are an example of abstracted representations where consid-
erable extra learning is needed to understand their meaning. A graph of the
stock market going up does not resemble a photograph of a stock market in
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which stocks are going up. How does this abstraction ability arise? And what
are the underlying algorithmic mechanisms? How hard is it to discover a new
kind of lawful transformation between things and drawings, i.e. a new law of
visual representation? What are the constraints on this lawful transformation
that allow them to make sense to us? What kinds of transformation wouldn’t
make sense to us and why?
Figure 1: A linear abstraction about abstraction.
As a concrete example let’s consider the ways in which we could represent a
triangular shaped object in the world, see Figure 2. The first extreme is photog-
raphy, you simply take a photo (a), and so each point in the scene A is copied to
a pixel in picture A. Another approach is to draw the outline of the triangle as
three straight lines (b), which superimpose and are at ‘exactly’ the same relative
positions as the edges of the original triangle. While this convention of using
straight lines is being used, the colour, internal pattern, position, orientation,
or size, or any combination of these properties of the triangle may be irrelevant
for the drawing (c). In more extreme cases, the shape, i.e. the 3 lengths and
angles of the triangle may even be irrelevant, in which case any three straight
lines making an enclosed shape could be drawn. More minimally one might just
draw 1 circle at the position of each of the vertices of the triangle (d). Alterna-
tively one might draw the lengths of the sides as straight lines emanating from
a central point, with the angles of the triangle preserved as angles between the
lines emanating from the central point (e). This representation may be opaque
and require some learning by the observer, but once the mapping is understood,
a human would be able to generalize to other examples of triangles represented
in this way quite easily.
At the other extreme, one may write the word triangle (f), or the x, y coor-
dinates of the vertices of the triangle on a Cartesian axis (g), or the equations
of the three line segments of the triangle, or the binary string that represents
the image in memory (h). One might compress the image using some com-
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Figure 2: Some ways of representing a triangle.
pression algorithm and represent the image as the file so produced (i). What
distinguishes these representations from the previous visual abstractions? One
critical way they differ is that some can immediately be understood by most hu-
mans and some cannot, without further knowledge. Understanding the gzipped
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file will be impossible by eye or hand. However, in all the examples both visual
and non-visual above, once the lawful representation method is understood, the
viewer can generalize to new triangles. Even in the case of the gzip, if a gzip-
ping and gunzipping machine is available, then the viewer could understand any
triangle represented in this way.
There is a kind of communication, which allows no generalization at all, and
that is arbitrary non-systematic communication where for any instance of image
which we wish to represent, we produce a random symbol or mark, which has
no lawful relation to the image at all. It is completely arbitrary. A triangle
at one position may be represented by a turtle, and another triangle by the
letter ’w’ and so forth. This silly method of representation would result in a
complete inability to generalize beyond the training set of images shown, and
as such would not be a very useful way of representing triangles going forwards.
There is no smoothness between the representation and the thing which is being
represented. Small changes in the thing to be represented do not manifest as
small changes in the drawing. Hence the lawful transformation we are looking
for should be topographic, an ordered projection [15].
Of course ”to represent a triangle” is an ill-formed task. To code this up, we
need to specify a minimal game which might be something like this. Agent A is
shown image A and agent B is shown image B. Agent A must draw a drawing A
such that agent B by looking at drawing A can tell if their own image B belongs
to the same class as image A. Both agents get rewarded if the communication
is a success. The property of the triangle which must be effectively captured by
the drawing A is entirely dependent on how the classes are defined in the data
set consisting of ’same’ pairs and ’different’ pairs. For example, ’same’ pairs
of image may consist of the identical triangle, and ’different’ pairs may consist
of triangles in which one vertex position is uniformly randomized, or ’different’
pairs may have the triangle randomly rotated. The exact nature of the training
set will determine what properties of the triangle must be communicated in the
drawing. If the viewer is not trained for each specific drawer, then a good draw-
ing of a triangle A is one which can allow this pre-trained viewer classifier to tell
in one shot if the triangle A is the same as triangle B by looking at the drawing
A and triangle B. So a drawing game is a subset of a language game [22], but
we add to the language game the constraint that there does not need to be
any (or much) learning by the viewer, other than their prior visual experience
with the world. Take the example of a map. A map exploits our pre-existing
experience of looking at things from the top, or our existing allocentric neural
representations [3]. If we didn’t have these priors, it wouldn’t be a useful visual
abstraction, learning to read maps would be much harder for us, maybe as hard
as learning language. An analogy of drawing exists in the auditory domain then,
which is onomatopoeia and sequencing of sounds in time, i.e. auditory mime.
An interesting experiment is to take two images from two different ImageNet
classes [7], show this to the drawing agent and reward the drawing agent for
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making a drawing which maximizes the probability of class A and minimizes
the probability of class B in pre-trained ImageNet classifier. This is closely re-
lated to the cycle consistency work of Chen et al’s in ‘Constrastive Learning
of Visual Representations’ except instead of learning a latent vector we wish
to learn a drawing [5]. A greater simplification is to show one image from a
class and reward the drawing agent for maximizing that class probability for a
viewer who observes their drawing. This would lack the contrastive element,
but if the drawing agent were trained on a set of training classes then it would
be fascinating to see if the agent could generalize to novel classes by the general
drawing procedure learned, e.g. would it learn orthographic perspective, or the
drawing of occluding edges, or shading? Would it be able to draw classes it
had not drawn before, and yet be able to make them recognizable? If so it
would be a general drawing agent, having had to discover methods of represen-
tation that were general to many drawable things, at least the very limited set
of things the pretrained ImageNet classifier was able to recognize. Even imag-
inary scenes may be possible, e.g. to achieve half-fish-half-cat, one might wish
that both ImageNet classes of fish and cat had high probabilities. To achieve
robustness one might wish to make the drawing resemblance be high even if the
drawing was viewed from many different angles. Would this result in a cubist
type representational drawing with multiple perspectives being shown? Why
should the drawing agent be conditioned on an instance of the class? Because
it needs to generalize to new classes to be effective. The above experiment has
already been done with humans. Hawkins et al observed pairs of humans who
represented objects to each other using drawings. As expected, they found that
over repeated interactions the drawings became more abstract and less veridical
[16].
A closely related piece of work is the Perception Engine by White [34],
where a stochastic search algorithm was used to optimize (unconditional on
any viewed scene) a drawing to maximize a certain ImageNet class probability.
White avoided the pathological false positive tendency of a single neural network
trained on ImageNet [27] by requiring that multiple independently trained net-
works give a high belief in the class, and also adjusting lighting and viewpoint
and hue in the drawing. He produced images that were in a sense ‘prototypi-
cal’ [35] representations of the object for those neural networks that had been
trained on ImageNet. The exact nature of this prototypy is a fascinating sub-
ject for investigation if we are to understand how imageNet classifiers work.
One consequence of White choosing to require the classifier to view the drawing
from multiple viewpoints is that it has encouraged the drawing to have it’s own
special kind of Gibsonian invariance [10], whereby the drawing must look like
the object from multiple angles simultaneously, one of the ecological motiva-
tions of cubism [12]. In fact, Gibson proposes that such an abstractive tendency
exists in childrens’ drawings of objects, which highlight invariant structure and
discount perspective structure, [10] pp78, saying “while drawing, he may be
looking at something real, or thinking about something real, or thinking about
something wholly imaginary; in any case, the invariants of his visual system are
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resonating. The same is true of the artist as of the child. The invariant are not
abstractions or concepts.” [10] p266. The reason that children may more often
choose to draw orthogonal projections is that they have the greatest number
of invariants, e.g. angle, parallelism, shape and relative size are conserved and
independent of the viewer’s fixed angle in space [9] p74. He goes as far as to say
“What modern painters are trying to do, if they only knew it, is paint invari-
ants. What should interest them is not abstractions, not concepts, not space,
not motion, but invariants.” [10] p271. Can one say that such invariants are
captured in drawings of objects from memory, as in the Sketch-RNN dataset
[14]? Certainly this dataset does not result in high ImageNet classifier class
probabilities. What exactly is the difference between invariants, abstractions,
and concepts? In any case, perhaps if Imagenet classifier networks could buy
art and exhibit them in museums there would be several rooms filled with these
masterpieces. This would be further confirmed if our own human paintings of
objects tended to give higher class probabilities than photos of those objects
shown to human observers.
We have already made headway in understanding how veridical representa-
tions of natural scenes can be generated. For example MONET [4] shows that
by learning visual attention masks at the same time as learning to autoencode
the masked units, it is possible to discover ’objects’ from a visual scene along
with soft saccade like attentional processes moving over the scene to identify
such objects. With some extra work these can be clustered into object classes.
Once an object class has been defined by some yet unknown abstraction pro-
cess, humans can draw archetypal instances of that class, e.g. as shown in the
QuickDraw dataset [14]. Using supervised learning it is possible to learn an
LSTM-GMM model that can reproduce these human sketches (SketchRNN).
Given a particular class of images such as faces, it is possible to train a GAN to
produce a veridical drawing (Spiral++) of that class [24], sometimes with quite
abstract looking depictions of the type used by children, e.g. a mark for each
of the two eyes and a mark of a nose and a mouth, which can fool a discrimi-
nator effectively. So we know that an adversarial GAN algorithm can produce
stylized drawings of objects recognizable as that class. So spiral++ (GAN) is
an instance of an abstraction making machine capable of producing veridical
visual abstractions.
But no GAN can produce non-veridical abstractions. For example, if a GAN
were shown visual scenes of Mount Fuji taken from different terrestrial locations,
a generator would never come up with a contour map of Mt Fuji seen from above,
because a discriminator could easily discriminate the tourist photos from such
a map. There is an intermediate zone of visual representations which is neither
photorealistic, nor entirely arbitrary like language. To learn conventions in this
zone requires some extra information in addition to that which can be obtained
from photographic visual images themselves. For example, to understand a map
one has to imagine the world from the top, and to do so one probably has to
move through the world, i.e. the representation is action dependent. A trans-
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formation has been made in the imagination of the position and distance of
the observer, floating high up in space. This gives us a clue to the rules of a
game which would result in drawings being made to represent things in a more
abstracted way than GANs can achieve, and leads us to the seminal work of
James Gibson [10].
To address the question we have begun to train drawing agents by reinforce-
ment learning to play a variety of ‘drawing games’. The hope being that playing
these games will result in the origin of interesting visual representations of things
in the world. All the games take an adaptationist view similar to that taken
by art historian Earnst Gombrich in ‘The Story of Art’, where new art arises
as a solution to a new representational problem. Non-representational drawings
can also be analyzed within an adaptationist framework, where each drawing is
trying to solve a more abstract problem. This adaptationist view helps makes
sense of abstract and conceptual art as well. Within our framework a particular
art form is formally defined in terms of computational aesthetic reward func-
tions (what the art is trying to achieve), and productive constraints on actions
(i.e. what limits are placed on mark-making methods). We envisage the artist’s
task as being to invent new and interesting games to play, and to devise new
and interesting constraints for playing this new game. However, in reality, the
reward functions of these games may be so complex, requiring a full model of
the human brain, emotion, and society, that it may be impossible to write them
down concisely, or at all. This perspective allows us to ask questions such as
“How many marks did Picasso look ahead?” i.e. to think of artistic mark mak-
ing as involving constructional planning, and also ask e.g “what was Rothko
trying to maximize?”.
2 Methods and Results
2.1 Pure communication game
Our first game treats drawing as the solution to a pure communication prob-
lem, see Figure 3a. Agent A observes a scene (a yellow circle at a particular
position), and must make a drawing such that when agent B observes their own
scene and the drawing, agent B is able to guess correctly whether the drawing is
of their scene or not. A dataset consists of pairs of scenes and balanced ‘same‘
or ‘different‘ labels. Agent B is trained by a cross entropy loss for classification.
Agent A is trained by reinforcement learning (A2C) [25] with the reward being
the negative log cross entropy loss, which increases as agent B improves its clas-
sification accuracy. The drawing is a physical bottleneck in communication.
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Figure 3: Drawings made in 6 kinds of drawing game, see text for details
2.2 Pure reconstruction game
The second game, Figure 3b, requires that agent A observes a scene, and makes
a drawing such that a reconstructor R is able to observe just the drawing and
reproduce the scene that agent A saw. R is trained using a mean squared error
loss and Agent A is trained by A2C with the reward being the negative log
mean squared error, such that perfect reconstruction produces higher rewards.
2.3 Pre-trained autoencoder based reconstruction game
The third game, Figure 3c, requires that agent A observes a scene, and makes
a drawing such that a convolutional autoencoder pre-trained on scenes, is able
to observe the drawing and reconstruct the scene. The autoencoder A is never
trained directly from drawings to scenes, but only on scene to scene. This is
intended as a pressure for the drawing to resemble the scene (from the point of
view of the pre-trained autoencoder). Agent A is again trained by A2C where
the reward is the negative log mean squared error of the pre-trained autoen-
coder. This is the most veridical example of drawings so far.
2.4 Equivariance game
The forth game, Figure 3d, requires that agent A observes a scene, and makes
a drawing D. But this time, agent A also observes a transformed version of the
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scene and must also make a drawing D2 of that transformed scene. A map-
per M network is then trained using mean squared error loss to convert D into
D2dash. M is trained to minimize the mean squared error between D2 and
D2dash. The negative log loss of M is then used as the reward to train agent
A using A2C. This is maximized when the two drawings D2 and D2dash are
identical. It is hoped that to achieve this the drawings should be a systematic
function of the scene, otherwise it would be harder for M to reliably produce
D2dash (resembling D2) from D. At the same time a reconstructor R is trained
to be able to reproduce the corresponding scene from D and D2. The reward for
the agent is a linear function of the sum of the two negative log reconstruction
losses and the negative log loss of M (which is the equivariance loss E) [23].
Without the reconstruction loss a trivial solution would be to produce always
the same drawing. Some systematicity can be seen in the top row, however, it
is not clearly shared over all locations of the yellow circle.
2.5 Mixed loss drawing games
A fifth game combines all of the above losses, Figure 3e to solve a slightly harder
representational problem where the circle can be in one of 25 positions.
In all the games we see that only by using the pre-trained autoencoder loss
was there any tendency to verisimilitude. Figure 4 shows the architectural out-
lines used in the first five drawing games shown in Figure 3a-e.
Figure 4: Architecture of networks used in drawing games 3a-e.
2.6 Conditional ImageNet classification game
A sixth very different game, Figure 3f, extends game 3c and requires an agent to
observe a random instance of an ImageNet class and draw that class such that
a pre-trained ResNet50 [17] gives high probability to that class. In this case
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unfortunately we have not yet been able to train a general image conditional
drawing agent, because the drawing agent always learned to draw an uncondi-
tional image of the class ‘from the imagination’, rather than drawing what it
sees. We intend to extend the DRAW framework for image conditional drawing
[13], training it not to autoencode but to produce the outlines of objects from
photos, and then subsequently optimize its parameters for maximizing an Ima-
geNet class probability. Because our drawing agent did not learn to condition
itself on the class image, it was not able to generalize to drawing other classes.
Our drawing agent has not had any prior visual experience independently of
suddenly being asked to draw a convincing image for a ResNet. This is not the
case with a visual human artist. The action space of the drawing agent is to
produce a circle of a given color at a given position, a richer action space may be
helpful. Also, we note that the process of hand-eye coordination in depicting by
drawing is not yet understood. Artists look back and forth between the scene
and the depiction, [9] p42 with brief glances with one or two fixations, they may
half close their eyes, make measurements, learn forward, stand back, choose ma-
terials, set perspective, use measurement techniques, squint, look for shadows,
drawing without looking directly at the paper, explore the lines and focus on
specific aspects of the drawing or scene, etc.. What is exactly happening in
this process? Is the artist making same/difference judgments between the scene
and the depiction, and how can this be modelled in a conditional drawing agent?
Figure 5: Sketch RNN trained on 5 classes, auto-training itself based on its own
productions. Over 5 iterations, very pleasing human doodly squiggles arise. The
resulting network with its squiggly prior can then be trained in an RL setting.
One solution to the problem of how to provide more general visual experience
for the drawing agent is to use a pre-trained network with some visuomotor abili-
ties, and subsequently train it to optimize certain representational goals through
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drawing. As a start one might take sketch-RNN (which is an LSTM-GMM) pre-
trained on a subset of similar object classes and re-train it on its own drawings,
which will result in an interesting degeneration (and exaggeration) of drawings
into abstract forms, see Figure 5. These human-like drawing priors can then be
modified to achieve a task.
Figure 6: Some drawings optimized using MCTS search over a space of high
level drawing module functions, selected using MAP-Elite with a variety of
computational aesthetic fitness functions, see Appendix A.
2.7 Abstract drawing games
A seventh even more different drawing game focuses on the production of non-
representational art. Figure 6 shows some images produced by a very different
set of non-representational drawing games in which agents are evolved to opti-
mize computational aesthetic reward functions, using MCTS rollouts of depth
5, with selection, to choose the most rewarding sequence of marks. The actions
over which MCTS acted were themselves complex pre-specified drawing mod-
ules. MAP-Elite was used to preserve a diversity of drawing solutions, with
the dimensions also being other computational aesthetic fitness functions. Ap-
pendix A lists briefly the set of measures used and the generative procedures
implemented. In these games there is no attempt at representational art, the
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functions are entirely abstract such as for example trying to achieve a scale
invariant fractal dimension. Let us assume that Jackson Pollock in making his
drop paintings was playing a game and succeeded in scoring highly on that
game. We can work backwards and ask what game he was playing. His drip
paintings exhibit a scale invariant fractal dimension. Pollock appears to have
isolated the underlying fractal dimension of human movement (at the wrist and
body) without any extraneous representational information, even prior to the
mathematical discovery of fractals [20]. This perhaps explains why his art is
interesting. One property may be maximized while simultaneously trying to
maximize another, e.g. filling in a central circle, or maximizing Phog hierarchi-
cal self-similarity [1] of the image whilst simultaneously reducing the entropy
of the image [30]. These juxtaposed constraints may sometimes result in inter-
esting solutions. The artist here is modelled as a generative planning module
interacting with a self-critical but diversity maintaining aesthetic module: MAP-
Elite was used to maintain diverse generators along these aesthetic dimensions
[26], and it may model the artistic practice of allowing serendipitous playful
discoveries, rather than focusing on one objective alone. In these experiments
human control was greatly relinquished and accordingly it became much harder
to make interesting images. In fact, we found that some of the images produced
by just a single generative module are often the most pleasing, sometimes even
without the need for any explicit aesthetic evaluation, e.g. see Figure 7 which
arises from a simple rule based system which draws random lines but which
changes the angle of the current line to the average angle of itself and the line
that it meets, resulting in organic thread like forms arising over time, and 8
which shows the result of using a genetic algorithm to evolve an LSTM module
to fill in a central circle with no more complex additional constraints. Here our
own implicit aesthetic functions are used in the evaluation of these images, but
it is not known what yet fully what they are. Certainly such understanding
would improve recommender systems. Figure 8 shows the evolutionary history
of marks made over sequential fitness evaluations. In my opinion, the search for
explicit hand designed aesthetic fitness functions described by equations may
be misguided, a conclusion also later reached by Stiny [32] despite his earlier
efforts 50 years ago to come up with such functions [11]. It is likely that a
greater promise comes from a more direct use of data itself in the construction
of aesthetic functions. A further argument against the search in equation space
for computational aesthetic functions comes from the possibility that what is
good taste in art may be learned from data biased by which works have high
social status currently in the art world [29].
3 Conclusions
We have only scratched the surface of all the drawing games which could be
played by and between agents. What if the viewer is not ImageNet but an re-
inforcement learning (RL) agent? This RL agent needs to solve a problem, e.g.
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Figure 7: An image produced by a simple hand designed rule based system
which draws random straight lines, but turns them when they meet another
line to the average its own and the other line’s angle.
navigate to some location. The drawer knows the location but must represent it
by drawing something in the world that the RL agent can see. Will they draw
a map? Under what pragmatic conditions will a map arise? If a viewer must
predict when to gather reward, and the drawer knows the reward pattern, will
the viewer ever learn to draw a Cartesian graph? If the viewer has emotions
(drives) in an RL game that makes it relax, run away, be hungry etc., then
the drawer’s job would be to manipulate the viewer into one of these emotional
states by drawing something. What will it draw? Perhaps if the RL agent plays
Atari games it will draw something to make the viewer run away, a supranormal
stimulus of a skull, making the agent jump right with very high probability?
OK, I admit, ‘go right’ isn’t quite an emotion, but the idea is the same. In one
extreme case if a drawing maximizes the probability of a viewer buying the thing
the drawing represents, then we have achieved optimal advertising. An artwork
is fully embodied in behaviour and hence emotion, not just classification and
discrimination.
Whilst deep learning has made great strides in object recognition, we still
know very little about the neural architectures needed for relational thinking
and abstraction of the type which causes constructional apraxia in lesions of the
Parietal Cortex [33], and which is needed for understanding of visual concepts
such as proximity, similarity, alignment and closure. All these concepts are
14
Figure 8: LSTM evolved to fill in a circle. Bottom left to top right are shown
sequential samples of fitness evaluations.
important for artistic composition. General scene understanding at the level
of visual affordances will be required for the kinds of visual metaphor neces-
sary for drawing abstract nouns, and also to make sense of scenes such as “the
last supper” in which it is the relation of objects that matters; that Jesus is
in the middle [8] of a alignment of apostles, and that they have potentials for
reaching bread and wine etc.. The scene is rich with possibilities for action.
ImageNet classifiers know nothing of these relational concepts. Once such ar-
tificial relational viewers exist then the work of White’s perception machines
can be extended to more complex scenes. In fact, many of the rules of Harold
Cohen’s Aaron explicitly hand coded such concepts, such as detection of overlap
and occlusion, balance of composition, etc.. Children also notice certain kinds
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of invariant in their drawings such as whether a line is straight or curved, that
a line has a beginning and an end, that lines can change direction with zig-zags
or continuously, that objects can be lined up, that a line can delineate a closed
form, that lines can intersect, or can be parallel [10] p264. These are the kinds
of properties that Paul Klee describes in his famous but incomprehensible Ped-
agogical Sketchbook [21]. Also they unconsciously and spontaneously appear
in the visual equivalent of mind wondering; doodling, in which without much
thought we generate and explore visual patterns [31]. But virtually all of these
kinds of picture understanding are so far lacking in neural networks.
The next step for us is to attempt to close the creative loop again by pro-
ducing an effective trainable image conditional drawing architecture and an
effective parietal lobe gestalt ‘abstractor’ which can discover novel dimensions
of relational concepts for the drawing agent to enjoy generating extra-ordinary
instances of. How should such an device for relational scene understanding be
trained?
4 Appendix A
Computational aesthetic reward functions used. 1. Fill central circle. 2. Mean
bilateral entropy 3. Negative entropy. 4. Phog self-similarity 5. Phog com-
plexity, 6. Region entropy, 7. Number of regions, 8. Felzenzawalb segments 9.
ImageNet entropy, 10. Distance from a power spectrum target.
The complex drawing modules are briefly outlined as follows. 1. Random
distributions of line. 2. Random lines with specific behaviours when intersecting
another line. 3. Pens with local allocentric views controlled by neural networks
(turtles). 4. Generators of random smooth bezier objects. 5. Random compo-
sitional pattern producing networks that output grids of lines with lengths and
directions. 6. Simulated pen holding robot arms that produce random oscilla-
tory motions. 7. Random LSTM agents. 8. Random LSTM-GMM agents using
the same archiecture as SketchRNN. 9. Pre-trained and self-trained sketchRNN
agents.
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